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Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime and Nuclear Disarmament 
      - Implementation of the 2000 Final Document -
Mitsuru KUROSAWA*
  International non-proliferation regime has been constructed in order to prevent 
the spread of nuclear weapons. In this context, non-nuclear-weapon states have 
demanded nuclear-weapon states to proceed to nuclear disarmament. Nuclear non-
proliferation measures are meaningful in the Sense that through preventing new 
nuclear-weapon states from emerging, it would not increase the possibility of 
nuclear war, and prevent he situation from going worse. 
  However, it has been argued that the regime is in essence discriminatory 
because it gives privileged status to the five nuclear-weapon states. In order to 
resolve this issue, the idea of nuclear disarmament within the framework of the 
nuclear non-proliferation regime came out. The idea has been pursued in order to 
mitigate the discriminatory nature of the regime and to establish more equal and 
peaceful world. 
  This paper will make a historical survey an this issue at first, by examining the 
process of treaty negotiation, in particular, the process of insertion of the Article VI 
and its significance. 1 will study the process of review conferences, in particular the 
arguments an the relationship between nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear 
disarmament at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, and the final 
document adopted at the 2000 NPT Review Conference. 
  Secondly, 1 will examine how the concrete nuclear disarmament measures 
included in the final document have been implemented after the Conference based 
an the arguments at the Preparatory Committees of the 2005 NPT Review 
Conference. The issues of comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty (CTBT), fissile 
material cut-off treaty (FMCT), non-strategic nuclear weapons (NSNW), negative 
security assurances (NSA), and diminishing role of nuclear weapons will be 
surveyed, as important measures for nuclear disarmament. 
  Lastly, 1 will conclude the paper with explaining the status of implementation 
and considering future challenges.
* Professor of International Law and Relations, Osaka School of International Public Policy and 
   School of Law, Osaka University, Japan 
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Pursuit of Nuclear Disarmament under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
Regime
Article VI of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
  During the negotiation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) which 
started in the middle of the 1960s, the U.S. and the Soviet Union lead the process 
by taking initiative and submitting their draft treaties. However their identical draft 
treaty that did not include the provision for nuclear disarmament. In the Eighteen-
Nation Committee an Disarmament (ENDC), non-nuclear-weapon states such as 
India, Sweden and Italy emphasized the relationship with nuclear disarmament, and 
Non-aligned States argued that measures to prohibit the spread of nuelear weapons 
should be coupled with or followed by tangible steps for nuclear disarmament. 
  As a result, a new Article VI was inserted at the final stage of the negotiation, 
based an Mexican proposal as a compromise between the nuclear-weapon states 
and the non-nuclear-weapon states. Article VI provides for the undertaking to 
pursue negotiations in good faith an nuclear disarmament and general and complete 
disarmament. It does not provide for the obligation to disarm nuclear weapons but 
to pursue negotiations for nuclear disarmament. The implementation of this 
obligation mainly depends an good faith of the nuclear-weapon states, but non-
nuclear-weapon states can remind them of this obligation and demand the progress 
in negotiation based an this Article. The Treaty provides for possible holding of 
review conference very five years, which would review the Operation of the Treaty 
including the progress in nuclear disarmament. 
  On July 1, 1968, when the Treaty was open for signature, President Johnson 
announced that the U.S. and the Soviet Union agreed to start talks an strategic arms 
limitation (SALT). It was the clear expression by the both Governments that they 
sincerely abided by the Article Vl. Review conferences were held in 1975, 1980, 
1985 and 1990, and concrete measures for nuclear disarmament were hotly argued, 
but they did not produce concrete results.
1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference
  In the negotiation of the NPT, the U.S. and the Soviet Union proposed that the 
Treaty should have an indefinite duration. On the other hand, non-nuclear-weapon 
states opposed the proposal, stating that they could not accept a treaty with
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discriminatory nature for an indefinite period. As a result, it was decided that 
twenty-five years after the entry into force of the Treaty, a conference shall be 
convened to decide how to extend it. In 1995, a review conference and an 
extension conference were held simultaneously as one conference. 
   The nuclear-weapon states that were strongly desiring to extend the Treaty 
indefmitely felt obliged to show how sincerely they were making efforts for nuclear 
disarmament. They agreed to start negotiations an a CTBT from January 1994, and 
also agreed the negotiating mandate for a FMCT. In addition, they all submitted a
Statement an negative security assurances (NSA) that they would not use or threat 
to use nuclear weapons against the non-nuclear-weapons states parties to the 
Treaty. The U.S. and Russia agreed an the reduction of their strategic nuclear 
warheads through the START process after the end of the Cold War, and the 
reduction has been implemented. 
   In their generalstatements at the Conference, many states, while agreeing to the 
indefinite extension, argued for some measures that could ensure the progress in 
nuclear disarmament. Consequently, the decision to extend the Treaty indefinitely 
was adopted as a package with two other decisions an "principles and objectives for 
nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament" and "strengthening the review process 
for the Treaty". The former stipulates future courses for every aspects of the 
Treaty, and an nuclear disarmament i  particular. Iturged i) the completion of the 
negotiations ana CTBT no later than 1996, ii) immediate commencement a d early 
conclusion an negotiations an a FMCT, and iii) the determined pursuit of 
systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the 
ultimate goals of eliminating those weapons. The latter provides to hold three 
preparatory committees in each of the three years prior to the review conference. 
  In the implementation of these measures, a CTBT was adopted in September 
1996 and opened for signature in October 1996 with many states igned. The 
negotiations an a FMCT has neuer materialized, and as a result his commitment 
has not fulfilled. On nuclear eduction, no progress has been seen after this 
conference mainly because of the deterioration f U.S.-Russia relations. At this 
conference, nuclear elimination was agreed at as "the ultimate goal".
2000 NPT Review Conference
  The 2000 NPT Review Conference succeeded in adopting a final document with 
positive engagement by each state and a president of the conference, in spite of the 
prior speculation that it would be impossible because the relationship between the
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U.S. and Russia was deteriorating and no progress in nuclear disarmament was 
seen. The final document includes the concrete measures that should be taken in 
the coming five years as well as the evaluation of the development in the last five 
years in all aspects of the Treaty. 
  In reviewing the Operation of the Article VI, the final document provides for the 
concrete nuclear disarmament measures that should be implemented in the future. 
The issue of future measures was intensively discussed in the Subsidiary Organ 1 at 
the Conference, and finally thirteen measures were agreed. Ort future disarmament 
measures, the New Agenda Coalition (NAC) that was established in 1998 and 
criticized the lack of the progress in nuclear disarmament, energetically proposed 
many measures for nuclear disarmament. Counterarguments came from the 
nuclear-weapon states, and discussions continued to find out compromises into the 
final document. 
  The NAC that consists of Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South 
Africa and Sweden played a central role at the Conference. These states have been 
very enthusiastic for nuclear disarmament for a long time, and the NAC is a 
mixture of idealism of the NAM (Non-aligned Movement countries) and realism of 
the Western states. 
  The principal demand of the NAC was "an unequivocal undertaking by the 
nuclear-weapon states to accomplish the total elimination of the nuclear arsenals". 
Finally the demand was accepted by all the nuclear-weapon states and included in 
the final document, although the content was watered down from the original 
proposal. On total elimination of nuclear weapons, the 2000 Conference accepted it
as "an unequivocal undertaking" compared with the 1995 Conference accepted it as 
"the ultimate goal". This means a big progress. 
  The thirteen steps for nuclear disarmament are as follows;
1. 
2. 
3. 
4.
5. 
6.
7
8
The importance and urgency of signatures and ratification of the CTBT 
A moratorium an nuclear-weapon-test explosions 
The necessity of negotiations an a FMCT 
The necessity of establishing an subsidiary organ to deal with nuclear 
disarmament 
The principle of irreversibility to apply to nuclear disarmament 
An unequivocal undertaking to accomplish the total elimination of nuclear 
arsenals 
The early entry into force of START II and the conclusion of START III while 
preserving and strengthening the ABM Treaty 
The completion and implementation of the Trilateral Initiative
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9. Steps by all the nuclear-weapon states leading to nuclear disarmament
10. Pl 
11. T he p 
12. Regular reports an the implementation of Article VI 
13. The further development of the verification capabilities
Reduce nuclear weapons unilaterally 
Increased transparency in nuclear weapon capabilities and implementation of
Article VI 
The further eduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons 
Measures to further reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons System 
A diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies 
The engagement of all the nuclear-weapon states in the process leading to 
total elimination 
ace fissile material no longer equired for military purposes under verification 
 ultimate objective is eneral and com lete disarmament
The Implementation of Nuclear Disarmament Measures
  Since the 2000 NPT Review Conference adopted the final documentl) in May 
2000, the preparation for the 2005 NPT Review Conference has already started, and 
the first and second Preparatory Committees for it have been held in 2002 and 2003 
respectively. 
  The final document was adopted by consensus which includes a variety of 
measures from nuclear non-proliferation, universality, non-compliance, nuclear 
disarmament, to IAEA safeguards, peaceful uses of nuclear energy, export control 
and others. In this paper, 1 will focus an some of the 13 steps for concrete nuclear 
disarmament measures as an implementation of the Article VI of the Treaty and 
negative security assurances. 
  After the last Review Conference in 2000, international security environment in 
general, and orte concerning nuclear weapons in particular, has radically changed, 
mainly because the new U.S. Administration has adopted new security policies and 
defense doctrines and the terrorists' attacks an September 11 th, 2001 have changed 
a threat perception of the U.S. and other countries.
1) On the analysis of nuclear disarmament in the final document, see Mitsuru Kurosawa, "The NPT 
   2000 Review Conference and Nuclear Disarmament," Osaka University Law Review, No.48, 
   February 2001, pp.l-38; Tariq Rauf, Towards NPT 2005: An Action Plan,for the "13-Steps" 
   towards Nuclear Disarmanient agreed at NPT 2000, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, 
   Monterey Institute of International Affairs, 2000; Tanya Ogilvie-White, Ben Sanders and John 
   Simpson, Putting the Final Document into Practice, PPNN, 2002.
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  As a result, the U.S. policy has shifted to give its short-term and narrowly 
defined national security the highest priority, to decide and act rather unilaterally 
than through multilateral or international cooperation and to depend more an 
military powern than an international norms in resolving international disputes. 
The U.S. has not been enthusiastic in nuclear disarmament through the multilateral 
cooperative framework. Ort the contrary, the U.S. have suggested the research and 
development of a new type of small nuclear weapons, and violated some of the 
commitments and ignores many commitments of the final document.
Nuclear Disarmament in General
  In considering how the promises in the final document have been implemented, 
there are two fundamental issues that tend to backtrack the original undertakings in 
the final document. 
  The ferst issue is that the U.S. declared that it no longer supported all 13 steps. 
At the 2002 Preparatory Committee, the U.S. told that it no longer supported some 
of the Article VI conclusions in the Final Document from the 2000 NPT Review 
Conference. A prominent example of this is the ABM Treaty (step 7) and another 
example of a treaty we no longer support is the CTBT (step 1).2) 
  According to U.S. statement at the 2003 Preparatory Committee, "Some 
countries have expressed concem over what they believe to be a lack of progress an 
the 13 steps from the final document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference... No 
country believed it would be possible to implement all these steps by 2005 and 
none believed that all NWS would make identical progress... While the United 
States no longer supports all 13 steps, we unambiguously support Article VI and the 
goal of nuclear disarmament... We think it is a mistake to use strict adherence to 
the 13 steps as the only means by which NPT parties can fulfill their Article VI 
obligations. The fundamental test is whether the United States or any other state is 
moving in the direction set out in Article VI."3) 
  Ort the other hand, the New AgendaCoalition (NAC) expressed its concern at 
the level of implementation and fulfillment of the NPT, stating that "the Nuclear 
Weapon States must show strong leadership by fulfilling the obligations of the 
Treaty and their undertakings at the Review Conference in 2000. This is a vital
2) Statement by Ambassador Eric C. Javits, Permanent Representative of the United States of 
   America to the Conference an Disarmament, April 11, 2002, NPT PrepCom, Article VI - Special 
   Time. 
3) Information Paper from the United States Concerning Article VI of the NPT, May 1, 2003.
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step in order to preserve the credibility and sustainability of the NPT. We need 
comprehensive implementation of the 13 steps - the blueprint for achieving nuclear 
disarmament, not lip service to them."4) 
  Swedish delegation emphasized "the danger for the integrity of the whole NPT 
regime, if countries start to be selective with regards to commitments agreed upon. 
The Final Document of the Review Conference in 2000 including the 13 practical 
steps to nuclear disarmament is an integral part of the NPT regime. It is therefore a 
risk to the regime if State Parties state that they no longer support some of the 
steps."5) 
  The second issue is concerned with the relationship between nuclear 
disarmament and general and complete disarmament (step 11). In spite of the fact 
that in the 2000 final document, "an unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-
weapon states to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals" (step 6) 
was stipulated separately from "reaffirmation that the ultimate objective of the 
efforts of States in the disarmament process is general and complete disarmament", 
France reiterated its original position to deal with nuclear disarmament within the 
framework of general and complete disarmament. 
  In 2002, according to French statement, pro-active stance must be based an a 
principle of reality. In this instance, the objective of general and complete 
disarmament illustrates this principle and it is inseparable from nuclear 
disarmament.6) In 2003, France again emphasized general and complete 
disarmament by stating that "In 1995, when the Treaty was extended indefinitely, a 
programme of action was adopted with three objectives: a complete ban an nuclear 
tests; the cessation of production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons; the 
determination to go forward steadily and systematically toward a reduction in 
quantities of nuclear weapons within the framework of general and complete 
disarmament."7 The EU statement also emphasizes the importance of "achieving 
our common goals of global nuclear disarmament and general and complete
4)
5)
6)
7)
New Agenda Statement made an behalf of Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, South Africa, Sweden 
and New Zealand by the Honorable Marian Hobbs, Minster of Disarmament of New Zealand, 28 
April 2003. 
Statement by H.E. Ambassador Henrik Salander, Permanent Representative of Sweden to the 
Conference an Disarmament, 2 May 2003. 
Statement by Ambassador Hubert de la Fortelle, Permanent Representative of France to the 
Conference an Disarmament, Head of the French Delegation, 8 April 2002. 
Statement by Ambassador Hubert de la Fortelle, Permanent Representative of France to the 
Conference an Disarmament, Head of the French Delegation, 28 April 2003.
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disarmament."8) 
  This idea leads to the very negative conclusion that unless there is progress in 
general and complete disarmament, there should be no nuclear disarmament. lt is 
contrary to the general understanding that the nuclear-weapon states should make 
efforts for nuclear disarmament as an independent measure. The idea could be used 
as a pretext for non-progress in nuclear disarmament. 
  Based an these two negative tendencies, the NAC analyzes the situation as 
deteriorating, stating that "To-date there have been few advances in the 
implementation of the thirteen steps agreed to at the 2000 NPT Review Conference. 
We remain concerned that in the post Cold War security environment, security 
policies and defence doctrines continue to be based an the possession of nuclear 
weapons. The commitment to diminish the rote of nuclear weapons in security 
policies and defence doctrines (step 9-5) has yet to materialise. This lack of 
progress is inconsistent with the unequivocal undertaking by nuclear-weapon States 
to achieve the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals. (step 6)"9)
  The Chairman's factual summary of the First Preparatory Committee in 2002 
described that disappointment was expressed in the progress made in implementing 
the practical steps for nuclear disarmament.1() The Chairman's factual summary of 
the second Preparatory Committee in 2003 summarizes the discussion and states 
that "Disappointment continued to be expressed in the progress made in 
implementing these steps, notwithstanding the recognition of the incremental nature 
of the process involved."11) 
  Generally speaking, the five nuclear-weapon states (NWS) have emphasized 
their commitment o and implementation of nuclear disarmament, non-nuclear-
weapon states (NNWS) have expressed their disappointment in this regard. The 
U.S. and Russia praised their achievement in the reduction of nuclear weapons 
through the Moscow Treaty, whose significance is examined later. The U.K., 
France and China have shown no new progress after 2000 in the Field of nuclear 
disarmament.
8)
9)
General Statement by Ambassador Tassos Kriekoukis, Permanent Representative of Greece an 
behalf of the European Union, 28 April 2003. 
New Agenda Coalition Paper submitted by New Zealand an behalf of Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, 
Mexico, South Africa and Sweden as members of the NAC, NPT/CONF.2005/PC.II/16, 29 April 
2003.
10) 2002 NPT Preparatory Committee, Chairman's Factual Summary, 18 April 2002. 
11) Annex II Chairman's factual summary, in Report of the Preparatory Committee an its Second 
  Session, NPT/CONF.2005/PC.II/50, 13 May 2003.
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Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)
   Steps 1 and 2 provide for the importance and urgency of signature and 
ratification of the CTBT and a moratorium of nuclear-weapon-test explosions. The 
treaty was signed in October 1996, but it has not yet entered into force, because of 
the lack of ratification by designated 13 states including the U.S., China, India, 
Pakistan, Israel, and North Korea. The U.S. attitude toward the CTBT under the 
Bush Administration is extremely negative and it is repeated that the 
Administration does not support he Treaty and will not ask its ratification to the 
Senate. 
  China has not ratified the Treaty, but keeps saying "China will continue its 
moratorium an nuclear testing and is committed to an early ratification by its 
legislature of the CTBT."12) However, it is not clear how soon and how seriously 
China is proceeding to its ratification due to the lack of transparency. 
  Japan is the one of the strongest advocates for the CTBT, working hard for the 
early entry into force of the Treaty. Ambassador Inoguchi stressed that "the CTBT 
will not only contribute to preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, but also to 
constraining the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons. The CTBT is one of 
the major pillars of the NPT regime as well as realistic and concrete instrument for 
the achievement of a nuclear-weapon-free world. It is truly regrettable that the 
CTBT has not yet come into force, more than six years after its adoption in 1996, 
leaving the future of nuclear disarmament in a state of uncertainty. Early entry into 
force of the CTBT must be achieved."13) 
  Chairman's summary states that "Strong support was expressed for the CTBT. 
The importance and urgency of the early entry into force of the Treaty was 
underscored. States which had not ratified the Treaty especially those remaining 13 
states, and in particular those remaining two nuclear-weapon states, were urged to 
do so without delay."14) The U.S. and China were referred as remaining two 
nuclear-weapon states. 
  In spite of the fact that the CTBT's entry into force is one of the clearest 
concrete measures toward nuclear disarmament and listed as the First step among 
the 13 steps, opposition by the U.S. Administration continues to be the biggest
12) Statement by H.M. Ambassador Hu Xiaodi, Head of Chinese Delegation at the 2nd Session of the 
   Preparatory Committee for the 2005 NPT Review Conference, April 28, 2003. 
13) Statement by H.M. Dr. Kuniko Inoguchi, Ambassdor, Permanent Representative of Japan to the 
   Conference an Disarmament, 29 April 2003. 
14) Annex Il Chairman's factual summary (note 11)
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stumbling block. 
  As the resumption of nuclear testing is suggested under the new U.S. nuclear 
policy, many states expressed their worry about U.S. attitude. The U.S. responded 
by stating that "While the U.S. will not pursue ratification of the CTBT, we 
continue to support he current moratorium an nuclear testing. The U.S. has not 
conducted a nuclear explosive test since 1992. We also support he establishment 
of the International Monitoring System for detecting nuclear tests. Proposals exist 
to decrease the time that it would take to resume nuclear testing, were that ever to 
be necessary. But that fact says nothing about he likelihood of a nuclear test. Nor 
does it relate to the development of a new nuclear weapon."15) However, it does 
not seem convincing to many non-nuclear-weapon states.
Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) and Nuclear Disarmament
  Steps 3 and 4 ask the Conference an Disarmament (CD) to agree an a program 
of work which includes the immediate commencement of negotiations of a FMCT 
and the immediate establishment of a body to deal with nuclear disarmament 
respectively. 
  However, the CD has not been able to agree an the program of work. The CD 
has been in trouble for last several years with agreeing an a mandate, because 
member states are intransigent to maintain their nationalistic attitude in agreeing 
mandates and the CD is operating under the consensus rule not only in the final 
stage of adopting a draft treaty but also in the initial stage of adopting a negotiation 
mandate. Unless some remedies are taken soon, the raison d'etre of the CD as the 
only multilateral negotiating body for disarmament will be lost and its very 
existence will be disputed.
Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (Moscow Treaty)
  Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty between the United States of America 
and the Russian Federation was signed an May 24, 2002 and entered into force an 
June 1, 2003. The Treaty will reduce each nuclear warheads to 1700-2200 by the 
end of the year 2012. The U.S. and Russia referred to the Moscow Treaty as a clear 
progress in the implementation of the Article VI of the NPT. 
  The Joint Statement by the two states submitted to the second PrepCom states
15) Information Paper from the United States Concerning Article VI of the NPT, May 1, 2003.
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that "The conclusion of the Moscow Treaty represents ignificant progress by the 
U.S. and Russia toward the goals of Article VI of the NPT. The Treaty's reduction 
in the strategic nuclear arsenals of the two countries by two-thirds from the levels 
existing today is a major contribution to the Gase of nuclear disarmament."16) 
  The U.S. explained the nature and substance of the Moscow Treaty in detail in 
its Information Paper as follows; 
      Following the successful completion in 2001 of reductions under START 
    from over 10,000 deployed strategic warheads to under 6,000, the Moscow 
    Treaty represents another major step in U.S. fulfillment of its NPT Article VI 
    obligations... The Moscow Treaty reflects a new era and a strengthenedU.S.-
    Russian strategic partnership. Because of this partnership, it was not 
    necessary to incorporate hundreds of pages of cumbersome rules and 
    procedures into the Treaty... By any measure, this Treaty is a meaningful 
    accomplishment... Some warheads removed from operational Service will be 
    stored in active status, others will be stored but disabled and not available for 
    quick redeployment, and some will be designated for retirement and 
    dismantling... The Moscow Treaty is a new approach for a new time. The 
   United States believe that the deep cuts in its nuclear arsenal called for in the 
    Moscow Treaty further demonstrate its ongoing commitment to the NPT. 17)
  Russia also praised the Treaty saying "The conclusion at the Moscow Summit in 
May 2002 between Russia and the United States of the Strategie Offensive 
Reductions Treaty has become a new major step forward in nuclear disarmament... 
While concluding the new treaty in the sphere of the strategic offensive arms Russia 
and the United States took into account - and reflected it in its text - the 
commitment under Article VI of the Treaty an Nuclear Non-Proliferation. 
Assessing the significance of the agreement, President Vladimir V. Putin 
underscored that "in the Letter and Spirit this is the confirmation of a choice our 
countries make in favor of reduction of nuclear arsenals and joint work to 
strengthen the non-proliferation regimes for weapons of mass destruction"."18) 
  The European Union, Japan and some other countries welcome the conclusion 
of the Moscow Treaty. However, the EU added, "In this context, the principles of
16) Joint Statement by the Russian Federation and the United States of America an the Moscow 
  Treaty (SORT), NPT/CONF.2005/PC.II/21, 30 April 2003. 
17) Information Paper from the United States Concerning Article VI of the NPT, May 1, 2003. 
18) Statement by the Delegation of the Russian Federation at the second session of the Preparatory 
   Committee for the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the NPT, April 28, 2003.
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irreversibility and transparency remain important."19)
  On the other hand, the NAC, the NAM and China are critical to the Treaty. 
  The NAC criticizes the Treaty from several points of view by stating "A 
development over the past year that we take note of is the Moscow Treaty. We 
acknowledge that the Treaty is a positive step in defining the new relationship 
between the United States and the Russian Federation. We question however 
whether the legacy of the Cold War has really been left behind since the number of 
weapons an each side still amount to thousands. And we question the Treaty's 
contribution to nuclear disarmament. The Treaty does not contain verification 
provisions and it ignores non-operational warheads. Reductions in the numbers of 
deployed strategic nuclear warheads are not a substitute for irreversible cuts in, and 
the total elimination of, nuclear weapons. We call an the United States and the 
Russian Federation to make the Treaty of Moscow an irreversible and verifiable 
instrument of nuclear disarmament."20) 
  The NAM statesalso critical to the Treaty expressing that "While noting the 
signing of the Treaty an Strategic Offensive Reduction between the Russian 
Federation and the United States an 24 May 2002, we stress that reductions in 
deployments and in operational status cannot substitute for irreversible cuts in, and 
the total elimination of, nuclear weapons."21) China also states that "The reduction 
of nuclear weapons should be carried out in accordance with the principle that it 
should, among other things, be effectively verifiable, irreversible and legally 
binding."22) 
  The Moscow Treaty was taken note of but criticized from the point of the 
principles of irreversibility (step 5), transparency (step 9-2) and verifiability (steps 
10 and 13), by the NAC, the NAM and China as well as even by the EU. 
  The Moscow Treaty takes the place of START process provided for in step 7, 
which recommends the early entry into force and fall implementation of START II 
and the conclusion of START III. It also urges to preserve and strengthen the ABM
19) General Statement by Ambassador Tassos Kriekoukis, Permanent Representative of Greece an 
   Behalf of European Union, 28 April 2003. 
20) New Agenda Statement made an behalf of Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, South Africa, Sweden 
   and New Zealand by the Honorable Marian Hobbs, Minister of Disarmament of New Zealand, 28 
  April 2003. 
21) Statement by H.E. Ambassador Rastam Mohd Isa, Permanent Representative of Malaysia to the 
   United Nations, New York, an behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement States Parties to the NPT, 
  28 April 2003. 
22) Working Paper an nuclear disarmament and reducing the danger of nuclear war, submitted by 
   China, NPT/CONF.2005/PC.II/WP.3, 28 April 2003.
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Treaty. When we evaluate the Moscow Treaty in the context of progress in nuclear 
disarmament, we have to take into account all elements, that is, the merits and 
demerits of the present outcome that we have new Moscow Treaty, but we have lost 
START process, and we have no ABM Treaty any more because the U.S. decided 
to withdraw from it.
Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons (NSNW)
  Step 9-3 calls for the further reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons. While 
during the Cold War era, focus was mainly adjusted an strategic nuclear weapons 
as was seen in SALT and START processes, the importance and necessity to deal 
with NSNW or tactical nuclear weapons (TNW) has been emphasized in the post 
Cold War security environment. 
  At the 2002 Preparatory Committee, the EU in its general Statement emphasized 
the importance of non-strategic nuclear weapons for the ferst ime, and encouraged 
relevant states to start negotiations an an effectively verifiable agreement an drastic 
reductions of there weapons.23) 
  Germany submitted a working paper an non-strategic nuclear weapons, and 
pointed out that there are significantly more nuclear warheads for tactical delivery 
systems than for Strategie ones; many of the warheads are presumably old and 
might have already exceeded their original lifespan; there are perceptions that the 
barriers against heir use are lower compared with strategic systems; storage and 
deployment patterns and possible additional transportation risks as well as the often 
smaller size foster concerns about enhanced proliferation risks and the danger that 
terrorists might gain access to them. It suggested following gradual approach.24) 
  1 Reporting by Russia and the U.S. an the implementation of the 1991/1992 
    Presidential Nuclear Initiative
2 
3
4 
5
Formalization of the Presidential Nuclear Initiative 
Agreement an reciprocal exchange of information regarding readiness states, 
safety provisions and safety features 
Start negotiation an non-strategic nuclear weapons 
The NPT Review Conference and its Preparatory Committee should be 
regularly informed
23) Statement by H.E. Carlos Miranda, Ambassador to Spain to the Conference an Disarmament an 
   behalf of the European Union, 8 April 2002. 
24) 2002 NPT Preparatory Committee, German Delegation, 11 April 2002, Non-Strategie Nuclear 
   Weapons.
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  6 Take particular security precautions (i.e. physical protection) 
  Finland and Sweden welcomed the German initiative, and mentioned 
transparency, irreversibility, reduction of operational status and confidence-
building measures as necessary elements in this regard. They recommended 
negotiations an a formal and legally binding verifiable agreement as soon as 
possible.25)
  At the 2003 Preparatory Committee, the NAC emphasized that non-strategic 
nuclear weapons posed great threats an the following reasons. Their portability, 
proximity to areas of conflict and high probability of pre-delegation in case of 
military conflict increase the risk of proliferation and of early, pre-emptive, 
unauthorized or accidental use. They can be more easily and frequently transported 
than strategic nuclear weapons. They could be appealing to terrorists due to their 
relatively small size and sometimes less sophisticated safety and security devices.26) 
  In addition, concern about NSNW has recently increased because of the new 
nuclear policy of the Bush Administration. The U.S. policy emphasizes the 
importance and usefulness of low-yield non-strategic nuclear weapons in order to 
destroy mobile as well as hardened and deeply buried targets. 
  At the second PrepCom, the NAC proposed to take urgent action to achieve: 
1
2
3
4
5
6
further reduction of NSNW in a transparent, verifiable and irreversible 
manner; 
further confidence-building and transparency measures to reduce the threats 
posed by NSNW, including the exchange of data an holdings and status of 
NSNW, safety provisions, etc. 
concrete agreed measures to reduce further the operational status of nuclear 
weapons system. 
formalizing existing informal bilateral arrangements, initiatives and 
declarations regarding NSNW. 
prohibition, as a first step, those typen of NSNW that have already been 
removed from the arsenals. 
enhancement of security and physical protection measures for the transport 
and storage of NSNW.27)
25) Statement by H.E. Markku Reimaa an behalf of Finland and Sweden an Non-strategic Nuclear 
   Weapons, April 11, 2002. 
26) "Reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons", Working Paper submitted by Austria, Mexico and 
   Sweden, NPT/CONF.2005/PC.II/WP.13, 2 May 2003. 
27) New Agenda Coalition Paper, submitted by New Zealand an behalf of Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, 
   Mexico, South Africa and Sweden as members of the NAC, NPT/CONF.2005/PC.1I/16,29 April 
  2003.
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  The EU also encourages all states concerned to start negotiations an an 
effectively verifiable agreement to best achieve the greatest reduction of these 
weapons. 
  The U.S. is negative in making legally binding instruments for NSNW, 
explaining that "In recent years, the United States has looked at the prospect of 
formal arms control treaties an NSNW and concluded that such an approach is not 
possible. The nature of these weapons and their delivery systems make it far more 
difficult to have confidence in treaty implementation than is the case for strategic 
systems. Delivery systems for NSNW are often dual-use, i.e. for conventional and 
nuclear roles, which makes it very difficult to have confidence that they have been 
retired from a nuclear role."28) 
  Russia is opposing to take up the issue as an independent measure by stating that 
"Russia proceeds from the understanding that it is impossible to consider the issues 
of tactical nuclear weapons separately from other kinds of armaments. This is the 
reason why well-known unilateral Russian initiatives in the sphere of disarmament 
in 1991-1992 are of comprehensive nature and, beside, the TNW touch upon other 
important issues which essentially influence strategic stability."29) 
  Both the U.S. and Russia are rather reluctant to accept legal reduction of 
NSNW, but we should pursue measures such as confidence-building measures 
through exchange of data and information, and enhancement of security and 
physical protection measures of NSNW.
Negative Security Assurances (NSA)
  Security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon states, in particular negative security 
assurances, haue been a hot issue since the time when the NPT was negotiated. In 
the final document of 2000 Conference, "The Conference agreed that legally 
binding security assurances by the five nuclear-weapon states to the non-nuclear-
weapon states strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime. The Conference 
calls upon the Preparatory Committee to make recommendations to the 2005 
Review Conference an this issue." 
  The NAM countries are very active in this point by stating that "the total 
elimination of nuclear weapons is the only absolute guarantee against the use of 
threat of use of nuclear weapons. We reiterate our conviction that pending the
28) Information Paper from the United States Concerning Artiele VI of the NPT, May 1, 2003. 
29) Statement by the Delegation of the Russian Federation at the second session of the Preparatory 
   Committee for the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the NPT, April 28, 2003.
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attainment of the total elimination of nuclear weapons, efforts for the conclusion of 
a universal, unconditional and a legally binding instrument an security assurances 
to non-nuclear-weapon states should be pursued as a matter of priority." 30) 
  The NAC submitted a working paper an security assurances with draft protocol 
or agreement annexed.31) They analyze the issue from the following five aspects:
1 
2 
3 
4
5
identification of the States providing the security assurances; 
identification of the beneficiaries of such security assurances; 
the nature and scope of the security assurances being provided; 
elements that would need to be included in legally binding instrument an 
security assurances; and 
in what format such security assurances would be provided.
  The draft protocol or agreement annexed includes both negative and positive 
security assurances. 
  Under the negative security assurances, the nuclear-weapon States as defined in 
the NPT undertake not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-
nuclear-weapons States party to the Treaty which are in compliance with their 
obligations under Article II of the Treaty. In addition, the negative security 
assurances shall cease to apply in the event of an invasion or any other armed attack 
an a nuelear-weapon State's territory, it's armed forces or other troops, it's allies or 
an a State toward which it has a security commitment, carried out or sustained by 
such a non-nuclear-weapon State party to the Treaty in association or alliance with 
a nuclear-weapon state. 
  Under the positive security assurances, the States party undertake to take 
appropriate measures in response to a request for political, military, technical, 
medical, scientific or humanitarian assistance from a non-nuclear-weapon State 
party to the Treaty which is a victim of the use of nuclear weapons. In addition, the 
States party undertake to cooperate with the Security Council of the United Nations 
in the event of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The Security Council 
shall consider measures in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations to 
address such an act or action. 
  In contrast with the NAM argument for universal and unconditional security
30) Statement by H. E. Ambassador Rastam Hehd Isa, Permanent Representative of Malaysia to the 
   United Nations, New York an behalf of the Non-aligned Movement States Parties to the NPT, 28 
  April 2003. 
31) Working Paper: "Security Assurances", submitted by New Zealand an behalf of Brazil, Egypt, 
   Ireland, Mexico, Sweden, and South Africa as members of the NAC, NPT/CONF.2005/PC.II/ 
   WP.11, 1 May 2003.
2004] NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERA TION REGIME AND NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT 17
assurances, the draft protocol or agreement proposed by the NAC contains the 
rights and obligations which seem reasonable by taking preceding resolution, 
document, and statements into account. This should be a basis for future 
discussion, leading to be included in the recommendation for the 2005 Review 
Conference.
U.S. Nuclear Policy
  The Final Document includes step 9-5 that provides for a diminishing role for 
nuclear weapons in security policy. 
  On this point, the NAC expresses its concern that "The fact that evolving 
security policies and defense doctrines continue to be based an the possession of 
nuclear weapons, indeed entailing possibly new designs and generations of such 
weapons as a counter to conventional warfare, can only further destabilize the 
global security environment and the NPT regime."32) 
  The NAM also criticizes U.S. policy by stating that "Strategic defense doctrines 
continue to set out rationales for the use of such weapons, as demonstrated by the 
recent policy review by one of the nuclear weapon states to consider expanding the 
circumstances under which these weapons could be used and the countries against 
whom they could be used. The possible development of new weapons and new 
targeting options to serve aggressive counter-proliferation purposes further 
undermines disarmament commitments."33) 
  The chairman's summary touches upon this issue by stating that "Concern and 
uncertainty about existing nuclear arsenals, new approaches to the future role of 
nuclear weapons, as well as the possible development of new generations of nuclear 
weapons were expressed."34) 
  The U.S. responded to these concerns by stating that "The new nuclear policy 
adopted by President Bush is specifically directed toward a reduced reliance an 
nuclear weapons... The New Triad will reduce our dependence an nuclear 
weapons for deterrence through modernization of conventional forces, the addition
32) New Agenda Statement made an behalf of Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, South Africa, Sweden 
   and New Zealand by the Honorable Marian Hobbs, Minister of Disarmament of New Zealand, 28 
  April 2003. 
33) Statement by H. E. Ambassador Rastam Mehd Isa Permanent Representative of Malaysia to the 
   United Nations, New York an behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement States Parties to the NPT, 28 
  April 2003. 
34) Annex II Chairman's factual summary (note 11)
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of missile defenses, and other measures... The Department of Defense has not 
identified any requirements for new nuclear weapons. We have not produced a 
nuclear warhead in over a decade. Certainly, cost and feasibility studier related to 
possible nuclear modernization are undertaken. Such studies, however, in no way 
represent a decision to proceed with development of a new warhead... There has 
been no change in U.S. nuclear declaratory policy and the U.S. has not lowered the 
threshold for nuclear weapons use... There has been no change in U.S. negative 
security assurance policy."35) 
  It is true that significance of strategic nuclear weapons has radically reduced 
because the threat from the Soviet Union in the Cold War disappeared. However, 
in recent years, the U.S. has increased the salience of non-strategic nuclear weapons 
as U.S. threat perception is now focusing an rogue states or terrorists. In order to 
respond this new threat, the U.S. seems to pursue small and low-yield nuclear 
weapons that could be used without much resistance. 
  Sweden strongly criticizes this development "as it would go against many of the 
commitment made in 2000 - unequivocal undertaking (step 6), the principle of 
irreversibility (step 5) and the diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security 
doctrines (step 9-5). lt could also threaten one of the corner-stones of the nuclear 
non-proliferation and disarmament regime, namely the Comprehensive Test-Ban 
Treaty since the development of new weapons probably would require the 
resumption of nuclear testing. (steps 1 and 2)"36)
Conclusion
  In the last three years since the Final Document was adopted by consensus in 
May 2000, we have not seen significant progress in nuclear disarmament by 
implementing the 13 steps. Some of the steps have been abandoned and many of 
the steps have been ignored by the nuclear-weapon states. Implementation of the 
final document, in general, seems to be much less than expected in May 2000. 
  The early entry into force of the CTBT is almost impossible mainly because of 
U.S. Opposition and non-ratification by other states including China, India, Israel, 
Pakistan and North Korea. Moratorium of nuclear testing is also under unstable 
standing because the U.S. propose to shorten the preparation time for testing,
35) Information Paper from the United States Concerning Article VI of the NPT, May 1, 2003. 
36) Statement by Sweden an behalf of Austria, Mexico and Sweden for the special time an nuclear 
   disarmament: Introduction of working paper an reductions of non-strategic nuclear weapons, 30 
  April 2003.
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although the five nuclear-weapon states maintain its moratorium. 
  The CD has not been working for several years and the nuclear-weapons states 
now Look loosing their interest in multilateral negotiations an nuclear disarmament. 
  The Moscow Treaty is one exception to general trend of no progress in nuclear 
disarmament. We should welcome the Treaty although it does not fulfill the 
principles of irreversibility, transparency and verifiability that are included in the 
Final Document. The real judgment of this Treaty will depend an how seriously 
and clearly the U.S. and Russia implement he obligations under the Treaty and 
how soon they proceed to the next step for further reduction. Compared with the 
START process, the Moscow Treaty is too slow, too ambiguous, and too flexible. 
  Both the U.S. and Russia are reluctant o reduce NSNW through legally binding 
instruments. However, as a new threat, we need to deal with NSNW more seriously 
and start negotiation wherever possible, such as strengthening their security and 
physical protection or exchange of their information for confidence building. 
  The nuclear-weapon states prefer the politically binding to legally binding 
security assurances. The Final Document states that "The Conference agreed that 
legally binding security assurances by the five nuclear-weapon states to the non-
nuclear-weapon states strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime. The 
Conference calls upon the Preparatory Committee to make recommendations to the 
2005 Review Conference an this issue." This means that the PrepCom should 
make recommendations an legally binding security assurances. The draft legal 
document submitted by the NAC seems quite reasonable in its rights and 
obligations, and it should be a basis of discussion this year and should be included 
in the recommendations to the 2005 NPT Review Conference. 
  In conclusion, recent rends in the progress in nuclear disarmament are deeply 
and significantly influenced by the U.S. nuclear policy and defense doctrines, 
which have a tendency to depend more an armed forces including nuclear weapons 
than an multilateral political or legal instruments and international organizations. 
The U.S. security policy in general seems depend more an rule of power than an 
rule of law. 
  It is necessary for us all to make every effort so that the U.S. will change its 
security policy in general, and nuclear policy in particular.
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